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Introduction  
“Muscat won popularity for his economic successes, but image unraveled after anti-corruption 
journalist was killed.”  
– Aljazeera (2019, December 2) 
In November 2019, thousands of protestors demonstrated in Valletta with signs and banners 
with eye-catching words like Ġustizzja (justice), mafia, assassini (assassins) and barra issa (out 
now), forcing the resignation of the former Prime Minister (PM) – Joseph Muscat (Carabott, 
2019). Under Muscat’s leadership from March 2013 to January 2020, Malta experienced 
outstanding economic successes like robust Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth at an 
average of 7.2%, an unemployment rate below 4%, the transformation of the national budget 
into surplus and reduced public debt (International Monetary Fund (IMF), 2019). This makes 
Malta an economic miracle, especially after the financial crisis, therefore it is rather shocking 
that Muscat’s heyday ended so suddenly.  
Public attention was garnered since the murder of Daphne Caruana-Galizia, a Maltese anti-
corruption activist who accused the Muscat government for involvement in financial crime. 
Simultaneously, the European Union (EU) accused Malta for its failure to comply with 
Customer Due Diligence (CDD) and the Anti-Money Laundering Directive (AMLD) (European 
Parliament (EP), 2017). These accusations are mainly derived from the Individual Investor 
Program (IIP), the Pilatus Bank scandal and Malta’s tax system. Furthermore, one of Malta’s 
biggest money generators happens to be the iGambling industry, which is a notorious money-
laundering tool for organized crime groups (OCGs). Besides, Malta also shaped its jurisdiction 
to be friendly to the blockchain and cryptocurrency industry (Vaghela and Tan, 2018), albeit 
knowing it is prone to financial crime.  
Malta is a microstate without any natural resources and it possesses few advantages that well-
known offshore finance centers (OFCs) like New York, London and Hong Kong enjoy. However, 
Malta’s economic reform led to the influx of foreign investment accounting for 1474% of the 
Maltese economy (EP, 2019a). Yet, the presence of illegality together with (over-
)financialization that extracts public finance and attracts (illegal) “hot money”, disturb the rule 
of law, distort the redistribution of welfare, and threaten the societal security, which are the 
underlying problems of this finance-based economic reform.  
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Financialization is not an all-new concept, but there is an acceleration of financialization in the 
last decade, leading to the increase in quantitative and qualitative role of financialization in 
our economy. For the former, there is an expansion of financial market in our economy 
(Epstein, 2005, p.33); For the latter, there is increasing penetration of financial instruments in 
the non-financial economy that makes non-finance sector resembling the finance sector 
(Shaxson, 2019). Financialization as an economic development model has been widely 
debated, but this model is welcomed by microstates. Microstates’ structural weaknesses push 
them to reform their economy to attract finance (Palan, 2002, p.151-152). However, there is 
no guideline on how far financialization should go to achieve optimal growth.    
Financialization is a double-edged sword, as it attracts both good and bad finances. It is bad 
finance that makes the finance-based economic development model risky. The Finance Curse 
theory contends that an over-sized finance sector, known as over-financialization, hinders 
economic development, as over-dependence on finance leads to effects resembling the 
Resource Curse (Christensen et al, 2015). Over-financialization attracts bad finance that is 
mobile, speculative and not locally-targeted, therefore its impacts on the political, economic 
and societal realms must be considered. Besides, illegality is inherent in our economy and this 
is the bad finance that extracts wealth from the economy, as criminals exploit the illicit 
economy the same way how other economic actors benefit from the licit economy (Andreas, 
2011, p.406; Andreas, 2002). The risks arising from illegality increase, when it accounts for a 
big portion of the economy, and when politics and organized crime intertwine. The risks 
generated by illegality when intertwined with financialization, therefore, also leads to 
political, economic and societal perils.  
Academic debates surrounding financed-based economic development model, Finance Curse 
and illegality are present, yet they are discussed separately. Shaxson (2019) explains over-
financialization as the shortcoming of financialization as an economic development means, 
yet there are two elements that are beyond the scope of his research. First, he focuses solely 
on the United Kingdom (UK), but the focus of this thesis is Malta, a microstate. Second, 
insufficient attention is given to the impacts of illegality vis-à-vis the Finance Curse. For the 
former, the Finance Curse might or might not be less detrimental to a microstate due to its 
smallness, namely if negative impacts are easier to spill-over from economic to political and 
societal dimensions, or such effects are easier to be contained or prevented. Besides, given a 
 4 
microstate’s structural weakness, economic risk is often already present, therefore political 
and/or societal risks might pose a more significant problem. For the latter, the influence of 
illegality in the economy is often neglected (Andreas, 2004, p.642). Nevertheless, the influence 
of illegality cannot be underestimated, especially for a finance-dependent microstate, as 
microstates often have a clientelist/patronage political system that increases the chance of 
illegality intertwining with politics (Veenendaal, 2019). Consequently, this thesis raises the 
questions: “How are financialization and illegality intertwined and what consequences could 
this have for the path of economic development?” 
To answer this question, this thesis adapts the analytical framework developed by Shaxson 
and Christensen et al. The Finance Curse focuses on three types of risks – political, economic 
and societal – that arise from financialization as a strategy for economic development, and 
applies it to study the impacts of financialization and illegality on Malta. By doing so, this thesis 
aims to serve a double purpose of theory-testing and theory-building for the Finance Curse. 
For the former, Malta serves as a most-likely case-study, as it follows the classic trend of 
microstates adopting the finance-based economic development model. By applying the 
Finance Curse, this thesis tests if the impacts of the Finance Curse might differ in a microstate 
from a great power. For the latter, Malta serves as a least-likely case-study, as it is traditionally 
not an OFC and it has both national and supranational supervision to curb illegality. If the 
thesis can show that illegality is strongly related to financialization, this makes it more likely 
to be the case in other more weakly-regulated developing states, therefore the Finance Curse 
should take illegality into account in future research. The sources collected for this thesis are 
qualitatively tested and process-traced based on primary sources including reports from the 
EU and independent investigators and secondary sources like news articles.  
This thesis argues that economic development has to be analyzed in terms of the economy’s 
net growth or the net contribution of financialization. In Malta’s case, the Finance Curse and 
illegality make Malta’s financialization strategies risky to its economic development, due to 
the political, economic and societal risks involved. Malta is an interesting case, as the Finance 
Curse originates from its political risk. Malta’s financialization strategies went hand-in-hand 
with illegality, giving the country’s elites growing power and the incentives to extract wealth 
from the economy. It is such political risks that sabotaged Malta’s stability, which later spilled-
over to economic and societal risks. This is contrary to the traditional Finance Curse theory 
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that sees economic risk as the roots of political and societal risks. When these risks are taken 
into account, the net contribution of these strategies is significantly lowered; decreasing 
Malta’s aggregate wealth.  
The finding of this thesis aims to show the underlying problem of the “more finance, more 
growth” model by emphasizing the importance of studying the net growth of an economy, 
instead of gross growth. Economic development should not be studied solely based on a 
state’s economic performance, but the inclusion of Finance Curse and illegality is needed, 
because it also incorporates political, economic and societal dimensions. In other words, 
economic development should be inclusive and cover a more holistic picture of the impacts 
of financialization, taking all short- and long-term effects. This way, the net contribution of 
finance to the economy can be studied. Such insights can contribute to Global Political 
Economy (GPE) and Security Studies academically, and also address the danger of this 
economic development model.  
Literature Review  
Financialization as Economic Development  
There is no universal definition for “financialization”, as its role changes from time to time, 
depending on its significance in the economy (Sawyer, 2013, p.7). This thesis adopts a broader 
definition that describes “financialization as a process” that involves two trends: (1)“the 
increasing role of financial motives, financial markets, financial institutions in the operation of 
the domestic and international economies” (Epstein, 2005, p.33) and (2)“the increasing 
penetration of financial techniques, and especially debt into different parts of industry…many 
parts of the non-financial economy, so that they increasingly resemble financial actors” 
(Shaxson, 2019). Since this thesis explores financialization as economic development, the goal 
of financialization here stresses the emergence of a regime of capital accumulation (wealth 
creation). Financialization is namely “a pattern of accumulation in which profits accrue 
primarily through financial channels rather than through trade and commodity production” 
(Krippner, 2005, p.174).  
Epstein’s definition suggests the quantitative role of financialization, which is generally 
measured by financial intermediaries size, namely “the value of some type of financial assets 
generally expressed as a ratio of the GDP” (Giovannini et al, 2013, p.108).This role can be 
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witnessed through “the increase in activity in financial markets, a rise in the value of financial 
assets, an increase in foreign exchange transactions compared to the volume of international 
trade, and other indicators of financial activity” (Kotz, 2015, p.23). Financial innovation 
brought the emergence of new actors like hedge funds and private equity firms (Lawrence, 
2015, p.202). There are also increasing financialization activities like buyouts, junk bonds, sub-
prime mortgages, derivatives and securitization, that shape the language of the finance sector 
today (Ibid), and are indicatives of the bigger role of finance and the presence of speculative 
financial activities.  
This trend of using financialization as a means of economic development can be observed 
throughout the 20th century, but there are several patterns that suggest the acceleration of 
financialization over the last decade. First, there is the proliferation of financial transactions 
and increase in financial integration due to financial globalization that opened up many 
economies through deregulation and capital liberalization (Mishkin, 2005, p.14-15). 
Consequently, there is an increase in investment, whereby states nowadays hold more foreign 
assets to GDP, indicating a growth in the global financial system (Poelhekke, 2016). Plus, 
digitalization has now changed the financial service operation, making financial transactions 
almost instantaneous (Vleck, 2008, p.20), leading to the rise of globalizing finance and huge 
capital flows. Many microstates welcome these phenomena with open-arms believing that 
they will boost economic development, thus they seize this opportunity to become 
independent, instead of relying on neighboring states (Ibid, p.6). After all, financial isolation 
discourages economic growth (Coulibaly, 2009). 
The prominence of financialization can be recognized through new techniques of capital 
accumulation. First, the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) in 2007-2008 revealed the power of 
financialization, namely showing the interconnectedness of finance and its potential on the 
world economy. Second, financial scandals like Luxleaks, Swissleaks and Panama Papers, 
exposed how states and banks offer financial secrecy to facilitate financialization (Bouvatier 
et al, 2017, p.3). Third, states are introducing ingenious ways like residency- and/or 
citizenship-by-investment (CBI) to exchange sovereignty for financialization in the last decade 
(Christians, 2017). These phenomena suggest that financialization is becoming more popular 
to develop economies in the last decade.   
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The role of financialization in economic development has garnered much attention. Literature 
from cross-country regressions (Goldsmith, 1969; King & Levine, 1993; Levine & Zervos, 1998) 
to regional or sectoral within-country variation (Rajan & Zingales, 1998; Fisman & Love, 2004, 
2007), suggest that there is a strong positive finance-economic development relations, namely 
supporting the “finance-causes-growth” standpoint (Popov, 2017). This is mainly because 
capital inflow increases liquidity and lower capital costs, which stimulates investment and 
economic growth (Mishkin, 2005, p.15). Besides, a developed finance sector can usually 
increase investment and savings volumes, and their allocative efficiency (Giovannini et al, 
2013, p.121-139). This is done through minimizing information costs (reduce information 
asymmetries between lenders and borrowers), improving risk management (bank’s low-cost 
services to reduce cross-sectional, liquidity and intertemporal risk) and promoting innovation 
(through research and development (R&D) evaluation and finance) (Ibid).  
Figure 1: Finance development and its effects on economic development (Giovannini et al, 
2013, p.122) 
 
However, financialization’s role in the economy differs from time to time per region and per 
country. The extent to which states embrace financialization also differs; the same goes for 
their financialization strategies for economic development. While many states are embracing 
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financialization, microstates in particular seem to have seen this as a promising method and 
more and more of them are engaging in financialization for economic development. 
Many microstates suffer from economic challenges due to inherent structural weaknesses. 
First, microstates often face economic challenges due to limited domestic transactions caused 
by low efficiency of scales of production, therefore creating high production cost (Armstrong 
& Read, 2000, p.287). Second, microstates generally open their economies to foreign income 
surpluses, markets and investments, due to a lack of natural resources combined with scarce 
domestic capital and low human capital (Fabri & Baldacchino, 1995, p.141; Kakazu, 1994). As 
most microstates rely on tourism for income, financialization proves to be a beneficial method 
for economic diversification (Persaud, 2001, p.208). In this way, a double-capital-accumulation 
strategy is developed.  
To achieve this diversification, the only asset microstates have to exchange for finance is their 
national sovereignties, or more specifically, “the right to write the laws” to shape their 
national economic development plans (Palan, 2002, p.151-152). This “importance of being 
unimportant” is what gives them freedom “to develop businesses within a framework of 
flexible financial, environmental and commercial registration regulations” (Armstrong & Read, 
2000, p.289). Many microstates share similar financialization strategies that have legal and 
economic structure suited to lower the entry barriers for finance, e.g.: favorable law and tax 
treatment to investors, bank secrecy and owning double taxation agreements (Koligkionis, 
2017; p.1357; Dharmapala & Hines, 2009, p.155-156). Not surprisingly, microstates have a 
higher probability to become a tax haven (Ibid). Yet, it is not easy for them to be recognized 
as players within the international finance world. Nonetheless, many microstates push larger 
states, especially richer OECD states, to “walk the talk” of inclusive multilateralism for closer 
cooperation and recognition, instead of “talk the talk” (Vleck, 2008, p.4). These moves further 
portray microstates’ efforts in financialization for economic development. 
While there is certainly some evidence to support the finance-growth nexus, the GFC seems 
to fail in explaining the perils of finance, as can be seen from the qualitative rise of 
financialization – the penetration of financial techniques into the non-finance sector (Shaxson, 
2019). The non-finance sector today has grown so powerful that it can profit from its own 
financial activities, instead of serving the finance sector (Kotz, 2010, p.4-6). Many non-finance 
firms are adopting the Wall Street logic, whereby financial assets and share value 
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maximization are given priority in the expense of the long-term profitability and survival of 
the firms (Aalbers, 2019, p.7). “Financial narratives, practices and measurements” are also 
applied in government institutions for capital accumulation (Ibid, p.9-10). This marks the 
beginning of “influence of finance on economy, ideology, politics and the state” (Shaxson, 
2019).  
The danger is that there is no guideline on how far financialization should go. Many states 
defend and legitimize financialization by arguing for national competitiveness, yet those 
benefitting from finance are not the aggregate economy but the economic elites (Christensen 
et al, 2015, p.257-258). This is due to the risk of “too much finance, finance that is too 
powerful, and the wrong kind of finance, unchecked by democracy” (Shaxson, 2018, p.13). 
Hence, the emphasis should be on the economy’s net growth, or the net contribution of 
financialization, namely “benefits minus the costs of oversized finance”, instead of gross 
growth (Shaxson, 2019). This is exactly what the Finance Curse is about. 
Over-Financialization and Finance Curse 
The “more finance, more growth” model has gained so much prominence for many reasons. 
Structural weaknesses from microstates make financialization an appealing economic 
strategy, as “it [does] not occupy a lot of land, [does] not pollute, and [does] not compete with 
local business” (Vleck, 2008, p.24). This strategy also generates a substantial amount of capital 
for further investment, which creates white-collar jobs and “increases the education and 
training prospects for citizens” (Ibid, p.27). This way, the domestic economy can be enhanced 
and increased employment could also decrease crime rates, and produce educated workforce 
(Ibid, p.13). Hence, it is believed that financialization enhances the aggregate welfare of the 
economy. 
However, finance-driven growth models face growing critiques since the GFC. Shen and Lee 
(2006) see the financialization-economic development relationship as a “weak inverse U-
shape”, namely a non-linear relationship. Checchetti and Kharroubi (2015) argue that when 
over-financialization occurs, finance retards the economy due to the over-reliance on the 
finance sector. This standpoint is agreed by literature stemming from the Finance Curse, which 
believes that over-financialization is harmful to the economy, because the Curse occurs when 
an economy is filled with speculative finance, rather than the essential finance that is needed 
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to boost the economy (Shaxson and Christensen, 2013). The former is mobile finance, which 
presents in an over-financialized economy, as it is often filled with “hot money” and runs the 
risk of relocation; whereas the latter is immobile finance that is locally-focused and 
contributes to the economy net growth (Ibid). The Finance Curse focuses on the former, as it 
is what should be subtracted to calculate the net contribution of financialization. The Finance 
Curse is therefore seen as “a development trajectory of financial overdependence involving a 
crowding out of other sectors and a skewing of social relations, geography and politics” (Baker 
et al, 2018, p.1). 
Finance Curse literature claims that an oversized-financial system resembles negative effects 
similar to the Resource Curse, as finance could be perceived as resource for economic 
development (Christensen et al, 2015). The difference between the two is that developing 
states are oftentimes the victim of the Resource Curse, whilst the Finance Curse tends to affect 
developed states (Ibid, p.257-258). The Finance Curse lays down both short-term and long-
term impacts of financialization, namely the eleven factors in Figure 2.  
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Figure 2: Finance Curse and Resource Curse: similarities and differences (Christensen et al, 
2015, p.257-258) 
 
 12 
 
Political risk (red) 
Economic risk (blue) 
Societal risk (green) 
 
Not all states face the same impacts as the UK. As risks are case specific, the intensity of each 
impact is also different per country. Thereby, this thesis categorizes these eleven factors into 
political, economic and societal risks to be applied on Malta. Political risk includes corruption, 
rent-seeking, political/country capture, political repression and conflict. Political risk is usually 
exposed, because states often undergo financialization at the expense of society’s political 
sovereignty. The political risk is greater, when the society is aware of the negative impacts of 
financialization. Economic risk includes Dutch disease, crowding out, economic instability, 
higher private debt, public debt, long-term growth damage, damage to entrepreneurialism, 
relocation risk and international contagion. Lastly, societal risk includes inequality, which is 
welfare risk – a sub-category of societal risk, as the finance sector is often advanced to please 
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the investors at the expense of aggregate welfare. By studying Malta with the guideline of 
three risks, this thesis also explores whether there are other impacts under these three risks 
that are not included under the Finance Curse.  
Christensen et al (ibid) studied the Finance Curse contextualized to the UK and were 
preoccupied with its ability to skew the overall structure of its economy. Shaxson (2019) 
highlights that in the UK’s case, economic risk is the motivator for political and societal risk. 
This is not a negligible problem, but it is one that presents itself quite differently to smaller 
developing countries, and especially for microstates, which already suffer from structural 
disadvantages and are actually hoping to achieve economic development and diversification 
through financialization. Such skewed structures have long been considered as a source of 
vulnerabilities, especially in circumstances of external shocks and crises (Armstrong & Read, 
2003; World Bank, 2019; Rustomjee, 2016), which means that economic risks have been 
present in microstates. This raises two questions: (1)whether financialization reduces, or 
further amplifies vulnerabilities inherent to microstates and (2)whether political or societal 
risks can pose bigger problems to microstates, given the existing economic risk.    
To answer these questions, it is essential to consider one further factor of financialization that 
is likely to have larger economic, political and societal impacts on microstates and other 
vulnerable economies: illegality. 
Finance Curse and Illegality  
Researching the Finance Curse in the UK, Shaxson (2018) mentions the “unmeasurable cost”, 
namely the cost originated from organized crime and other illicit activities. However, only 
corruption and rent-seeking, that are related to this “unmeasurable cost” are included in 
Christensen et al’s (2015) research. This negligence is problematic, as Shaxson (2018, p.11) 
sees the City of London’s competitiveness as “Britain’s soft-touch approach to policing dirty 
money and financial crime”. Every economy “has its illicit counterpart”, as “licit and illicit funds 
flow through the same global banking system and are sheltered in the same off-shore financial 
havens” (Andreas, 2004, p.644). This indicates the risk of illegality, especially when the size of 
this “illicit counterpart” is big. The underlying logic of finance’s interconnectedness to illegality 
is based on financialization’s interpretation as a double-edged sword. Policies and systems 
that are attractive to good finance also attract bad finance. This is because criminals, as homo 
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economicus, run the same logic and would exploit the illicit counterpart of the economy 
similar as how other economic actors benefit from the licit sector. This is most dangerous, 
when the richest and most powerful actors in the economy involve in this “illicit counterpart”, 
resulting in “whoever has the gold, makes the rules” becomes the Golden Rule of the economy 
(Shaxson, 2018. p.23). This is particularly evident in microstates, where “smallness” actually 
fosters clientelism that increases the chance of corruption and involvement in organized 
crime, because “smallness” enables “constant direct contact and overlapping” citizen-
politicians role relations and “stronger monitoring mechanisms” (Veenendaal, 2019). 
Therefore, illegality’s danger encompasses economic, political, and societal risks. Even worse, 
the infiltration of organized crime in finance also leads to security risks, another sub-category 
of societal risks that is missing from the Finance Curse. Here, for microstates, there lies 
significant danger when illegality intertwines with politics. This is because a healthy political 
climate is important to safeguard the economy from financial volatility, which is exceptionally 
risky for states that depend on financialization for economic development.  
Simply put, financialization is often intertwined with illegality and the consequences resemble 
what the Finance Curse states, namely economic, political and societal risks. This shows the 
importance of studying illegality. Yet, this topic has never garnered enough attention due to 
its awkward position in academia that falls “through the disciplinary cracks of social science” 
(Andreas, 2004, p.642). This is certainly true for GPE and Political Science, as shown by the 
Finance Curse. This lacuna is exactly what this thesis aims to fill in, by studying the impacts of 
illegality using the Finance Curse. 
 
In short, mainstream debates on financialization as economic development strategy are 
dominated by the “more finance, more growth” model. This is falsified by the Finance Curse 
in the case of over-financialization. However, the Finance Curse has its shortcomings, namely: 
(1)the focus on great powers like the UK, yet this thesis focuses on microstates, and 
(2)neglecting illegality. The answer to this thesis’ research question is also scattered all over 
different literature. Hence, this thesis aims to combine all these elements to study what 
consequences the interconnection between financialization and illegality have on the path of 
economic development for microstates. This is done by considering the risk of illegality when 
it comes to undertaking financialization strategies. It is also still unknown if the Finance Curse 
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would be more or less harmful to microstates, therefore this thesis first studies how 
financialization strategies undertaken by Malta intertwine with illegality, and then analyzes 
the outcomes based on political, economic and societal risks. This way, this thesis serves the 
double-purpose of theory-testing and theory-building.   
Methodology    
This thesis chooses Malta as the within-case-study for double purposes of theory-testing and 
theory-building. For the former, Malta constitutes the universal trend of microstates adopting 
financialization for economic development. Malta serves as a good example for this purpose, 
because it seems to be successful in this development model, proven by e.g.: reduced public 
debt, budget surplus and high GDP growth. By studying Malta, this thesis tests whether the 
impacts of the Finance Curse are more or less detrimental to microstates, namely if spill-over 
effects to political and societal terms would take place, or if it is easier for a microstate to 
contain and/or prevent such spill-over to occur. 
For the latter, Malta is the least-likely case for this style of economic development, because it 
is traditionally not an OFC, but has recently embarked on this route for economic 
development, as shown by its acceleration in financialization between 2013-2019. Plus, Malta 
is a critical case, as it is an EU Member-State, which has relatively extensive mechanisms and 
strict regulations to curb illegality. For example, the EU has the AMLD, Europol that frequently 
checks on economic crime and the supervision of European Central Bank (ECB) to reduce 
illegality risk. Besides, Malta prides itself in having the “most stringent and of the highest 
standard” four-tier due-diligence process (MIIPA, n.d.). This means that there are national and 
supranational measurements to restrain illegality. In this least-likely scenario of involving 
illegality, Malta serves as an ideal state to test the impacts of illegality intertwined with 
financialization. If the analysis shows that the illegality risk exposed to Malta is devastating, 
this thesis would serve good theory-building purpose, as it would entail that illegality is 
important to be emphasized in the Finance Curse. If this holds true, impacts found beyond the 
Finance Curse can also strengthen this theory.  
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This thesis focuses on the period 2013-2019 when Malta accelerated its financialization 
strategies. It focuses in particular on the following reforms:  
1. The introduction of Individual Investor Program in 2014  
2. Low taxation to attract investors  
3. Regulatory support to the expansion of the banking sector  
4. Financialization through digital innovation  
These strategies demonstrate the purpose and manifestation of financialization – (1)the 
expansion of the finance sector, (2)the increasing penetration of financialization in the non-
finance sector and (3)capital accumulation. With these strategies, Malta succeeded in 
attracting more capital, which can be seen from its economic improvements. Besides more 
traditional fiscal strategies like tax relaxation, Malta’s also introduced a more contemporary 
strategy by establishing its own CBI scheme – IIP, to attract more capital. Additionally, Malta 
utilizes digitalization by integrating more digital methods (i.e.:iGaming, blockchain and 
cryptocurrency) to undergo financialization. Such digital innovation shows Malta’s creativity 
in financialization, which represents the finance sector characteristics today. Being introduced 
since 2013, these strategies indicate the acceleration of financialization process. Hence, this 
thesis analyses the impact of four financialization strategies, aiming to provide a more 
accurate picture of financialization today and to increase the validity of the result.  
The dependent variable here is illegality. Illegality is a form of “unmeasurable cost”, yet this 
cost cannot be neglected. This thesis uses a GPE lens to study illegality, which means a more-
rounded cost is analyzed. This is why the eleven factors from Finance Curse are categorized 
into economic, political and societal risk (both welfare and security risks), to serve as indicators 
to study the impacts of illegality when it intertwines with financialization in economic 
development. In this way, these three risks make this “unmeasurable cost” measurable. 
Furthermore, they analyze both short-term and long-term damage, serving a better reference 
for states that embark on this route for economic development.   
These impacts are qualitatively tested and process-traced using first, primary sources like 
reports from the EU and investigative reports from various independent investigators; and 
second, secondary sources like news. Since the death of Caruana-Galizia, her work is mainly 
continued by “a group of 45 journalists representing 18 news organizations from 15 countries” 
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that run independent investigations to reveal the truth behind Malta (OCCRP, n.d.). These 
sources provide valid inputs, because governmental reports are likely to glorify the impacts of 
financialization on its economic development. Moreover, illegality and white-collar crime are 
often covered for the government’s own interests, e.g.: to maintain in power, prevent political 
turmoil and gain public confidence.  
Overall, the contemporary nature of this case gives a useful insight in terms of first, the 
techniques of financialization today; second, the problems that might arise from such 
techniques taking the modus operandi of modern illegality into account, despite the presence 
of strict mechanisms and regulations. These factors further strengthen the thesis’ aims of 
theory-testing and theory-building.  
The Trajectory of Financialization in Malta 
The evolution of the Maltese financial system is better understood from the 1990s onward, 
when Malta started to pursue trade liberalization by lowering its interest rate and forgoing 
capital controls (Grech, 2015). Its accession to the EU in 2004 has further smoothened this 
process, yet its financial sector had always remained very traditional, based on standard 
lending, with “local banks depending on resident deposits to finance their activities” (Ibid). 
For this reason, Malta’s finance sector was relatively limited, as it accrued its main income 
from tourism and manufacturing sectors. However, Malta’s transition to economic 
liberalization was hindered by multiple adverse demand and supply shocks in the 2000s and 
the GFC (Grech & Zerafa, 2017, p.17). Malta’s real GDP growth averaged at 2%, and the island 
ran a current account deficit (Ibid, p.18). The European debt crisis further worsened Malta’s 
situation when it plunged many European states into a financial crisis. However, due to 
Malta’s banking system and limited finance sector that resulted in less international exposure, 
Malta survived the crisis.  
The turning point took place when the fear of bail-out creeped into Malta’s finance sector 
following the Cypriot Financial Crisis. To gain political confidence, Malta’s newly-elected Labor 
party undertook economic reform to temper the fear and avoid itself from being dragged into 
the crisis. In an attempt to understand the quantitative and qualitative roles of 
financialization, Malta’s strategies are investigated. As these strategies enable each other to 
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be exploited for illegality due to its cross-sector nature, this chapter first explains the 
mechanism of each financialization strategy separately.  
The Introduction of Individual Investor Program in 2014 
The IIP was introduced as the Maltese version of CBI, whereby citizenship is granted for those 
who contribute to Maltese economic development. The condition of gaining citizenship 
through this scheme is straightforward, namely a one-off contribution/donation to Malta, 
government bonds and property purchase which totals circa €900,000 (MIIPA, n.d.). 
Citizenship for immediate family can also be bought through IIP (Maltese Citizenship Act 
(CAP.188), 2014). Besides financial and due-diligence requirements, there are barely other 
integration requirements. There is no naturalization exam, nor a Maltese and English language 
proficiency requirement. IIP applicants only need to reside in Malta for 183 days or visit Malta 
to buy/lease a property to satisfy the residential requirement (Malta Immigration, n.d.). Once 
these requirements are satisfied, citizenship can be granted within a year (ibid).  
IIP is a carefully-crafted strategy, as both property and government bond purchased/lease are 
required to be held for at least five years, which act as an anchor for Malta to secure 
investment from each applicant for that period and to avoid the emergence of speculative 
investment that can lead to capital flight. This scheme is specifically targeted at high-net-
worth individuals (HNWIs), as they are financially independent and might be able to further 
contribute to Malta financially, given Malta’s healthy economic climate. IIP has attracted 
approximately €850 million from 1101 applicants, turning Malta’s budget into a surplus 
(Bagnoli, 2018). This amount is equivalent to 40% of tax revenues and has partially contributed 
to Malta’s GDP growth these years (Gold & El-Ashram, 2015, p.49; IMF, 2019). This scheme is 
strategic, as the capital generated can act as a fiscal buffer and build precautionary balances 
to offset any shocks (Xu et al, 2015, p.16), amongst other investments. This economic climate 
can boost employment, which might be the reason for Malta’s low unemployment rate (IMF, 
2019). Such great contributions would have not been possible in the case of naturalization 
through other means.  
Low Taxation to Attract Investors  
Based on the “impossible trinity”, the only macroeconomic policy feasible in Malta is fiscal 
policy, as it renounces its monetary policy along joining the Eurozone. Therefore, taxation is 
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used as Malta’s financialization instrument. According to Maltese Income Tax Law CAP 123, 
income tax is taxed progressively from 0-35%. However, due to the difference made between 
domicile and residence, foreigners generally benefit from this law. Article 4(g) states that:  
Figure 4: Maltese Income Tax Law CAP 123 Article 4(g) 
 
The attractiveness of this clause, for the HNWIs, lies in the possibility of “passport-shopping” 
and obtaining citizenship through IIP (Henley, 2018). This is a great opportunity for tax-
planning, as income earned abroad can be tax-free or taxed at a lower rate. There is also no 
inheritance tax, estate tax, wealth tax, capital acquisition tax, capital duty and real property 
tax (Deloitte, 2019), which is beneficial for fortune-transfers. For corporations, Malta imposes 
35% corporate tax rate. However, foreign corporations that “are ordinarily resident but not 
domiciled in Malta are taxable in Malta on a source and remittance basis” (Ibid). 
Consequently, many foreign corporations pay only 0-10% effective tax rate, due to the 
possibility for tax refund and tax exemption. In this way, Malta has the lowest income tax in 
the EU (Grech, 2017a). Malta also runs a full imputation system and owns over 70 Double Tax 
Treaties agreements with other states that avoid double taxation (Finance Malta, n.d.).  
These perks contribute to Malta’s iGambling, blockchain and cryptocurrency industry’s 
success. At first sight, these low tax rates might seem counter-intuitive due to lower tax 
revenue, but the inflow of HNWI and corporations can lead to increasing foreign direct 
investment (FDI). Plus, economic actors are homo economicus that seek profit-maximization, 
thus they usually move to where taxes are the lowest. By having these attractive tax rates, 
Malta becomes a reputable OFC and a top choice for over 74,000 entities to (re)locate their 
subsidiaries and intellectual property rights (Faccio, 2017, p.4).  
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Regulatory Support to the Expansion of the Banking Sector 
Malta’s banking system has grown from housing only four to 24 licensed banks today; only 
three of these are Maltese (EBF, n.d.). Since then, the Maltese banking sector has evolved 
from domestic-focused to international-oriented banking. To accommodate both local and 
international needs, Malta has undergone “innovation through regulation”, by introducing 
both financial and non-financial institutions to stimulate a banking environment that 
facilitates other financialization strategies (Finance Malta, n.d.). First, the Malta Financial 
Service Authority (MFSA) was established to regulate and supervise banks under the MFSA 
Act 2002. All banks must be approved by the MFSA to operate in Malta, and they are obliged 
to submit statistical returns for risk management purpose (Ibid). Since 2014, this mechanism 
is further upgraded due to the supervision of the ECB and the implementation of the EU 
Banking Legislation (CRDIV/CRR) (Ibid). The same EU standard is also applied to Malta’s AML 
mechanisms that is supervised by the Financial Intelligence Analysis Unit (FIAU). The FIAU has 
since received supervision, guidance and recommendation from EU institutions, including 
European Commission (EC), EP, ECB and European Banking Authority. This means that banks 
in Malta are frequently checked by several institutions at both national and supranational 
level. Malta’s regulations, with the help of MFSA, go beyond the EU’s Fifth AML to improve its 
AML mechanisms (Young & Ganado, 2019).  
Overall, Malta has put much regulatory effort to expand its banking sector to become an 
internationally accredited banking center. This is important for its reputation for further 
financialization and to attract more investors.  
Financialization through Digital Innovation  
Malta is powered with digital innovation that enables it to explore financialization beyond 
traditional means, namely through iGaming, blockchain and cryptocurrency industry, to 
achieve its goal to become the “Silicon Valletta” –  an initiative that was introduced in 2016 to 
advance its digital sector.  
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iGaming Industry  
Malta is the first EU Member-State to regulate online gambling through Malta Gaming 
Authority in the 2000s. It now hosts the EU’s biggest iGambling industry, housing over 513 
online casinos (NexiaBT, 2019). Malta’s booming iGaming business comes with its effort in 
building this empire. First, gaming tax rates are low for both players and corporations, which 
give great incentives for both to land in Malta. Second, Malta offers R&D tax credits and/or 
grants for companies that run industrial R&D (Ibid). Third, Malta widely encourages high-value 
adding start-ups in this industry by providing grants for relocation, professional and 
consultancy fees. Fourth, Malta’s license is attractive due to the easiness to obtain it, its low 
price and its license grants online casino operation in both Malta and the EU. Plus, license fees 
are waived for new operators in the first year. To facilitate this industry, Malta constantly 
upgrades itself, by for example, establishing the European Gaming Institute of Malta to supply 
skilled workers in this sector, hosting SiGMA – the world’s biggest annual iGaming Festival, 
attracting more potential global gaming companies to Malta (SiGMA, n.d.).  
The iGaming industry plays a significant role in the Maltese economy today and this industry 
keeps growing over the years. It generates a total of circa €1.2 billion annually, which is 
approximately 12% of Malta’s GDP (Civillini & Anesi, 2018). This growth continues, due to 
Malta’s entrepreneurial spirit and further efforts in building its Blockchain Island and 
cryptocurrency hub.  
Blockchain and Cryptocurrency Industry  
Malta applies ‘innovation through regulation’ in these industries as well, namely through The 
Innovative Technology Arrangements and Service Acts, The Virtual Financial Assets Acts and 
The Malta Digital Innovation Authority Acts (Library of Congress, 2018). Such regulations 
provide certainty and security for blockchain-related companies, knowing that compliance to 
the regulations would grant their survival, especially because many states ban blockchain and 
cryptocurrency activities. For these reasons, the world’s largest cryptocurrency companies like 
Binance, OKEx and ZBX have since moved their headquarters to Malta. Binance’s entry to 
Malta is exceptionally significant, as it is the world’s largest cryptocurrency exchange, and it 
even cooperates with the Malta Stock Exchange (Aitken, 2018). This move signals a meaningful 
recognition for Malta as a Blockchain Island and its potential to become a crypto-economy 
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giant, especially being described as “a global hub for blockchain technology through active 
and transparent crypto regulations” (Ibid).  
Malta is very innovative in a way that blockchain is not simply used as another financialization 
strategy, but it helps to improve Malta’s iGaming and cryptocurrency sector. This kill-two-
birds-with-one-stone strategy definitely helps to catch up with technology today and to 
diversify Malta’s financialization strategy. 
 
In short, Malta’s financialization strategies showcase its comparative advantage – low 
taxation, its innovation and creativity in financialization strategies, and its willingness to 
regulate. As shown, these strategies are not limited to only the finance sector, but its non-
finance sector-based strategies, namely IIP and digital innovation-based strategies, are also 
being used as financial instruments to accumulate capital. This again, portrays the quantitative 
and qualitative role of financialization.  
Each of these strategies shows the success in Malta’s economic reform, as can be seen from 
the increase in the size of its finance sector and the intertwine of its finance sector and non-
finance sector. The dependence on Malta’s economy on these strategies is also clear, proven 
by their contributions to Malta’s GDP, employment and current account surplus. All these 
strategies eventually help Malta to become one of the fastest-growing economies in Europe.  
Malta, Finance Curse and Illegality  
Malta shows impressive numbers in terms of economic growth, but this thesis’ emphasis lies 
on net economic growth which goes beyond these numbers. To examine the net contribution 
of Malta’s financialization strategies, this chapter is dedicated to map the field to decipher 
first, how Malta’s financialization strategies intertwine with illegality and second, its 
consequences on economic development in terms of the “unmeasurable cost” of Finance 
Curse – political, economic and societal risks.  
Political Risk  
Malta’s economic miracle was no longer a fairytale when the Maltese political turmoil 2019-
2020 erupted. The political risk exposed by financialization in Malta has close co-relations with 
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its political institution, as Malta’s smallness fosters clientelist/patronage relations 
(Veenendaal, 2019). Albeit corruption is present in almost all economies, the scandals that 
took place in Malta deteriorated its score on the Corruption Perception Index tremendously 
(Transparency International, 2019, p.23), suggesting a pattern that financialization shares co-
relation with illegality. As most scandals are connected with each other, this section maps out 
how Malta’s financialization strategies bring clientelist/patronage relations closer that 
amplifies illegality and explains the political risk exposed as a whole.  
The IIP was passed in 2013 despite strong opposition from the Opposition Party and the EC, 
because it is prone to crime (Vella, 2014). The IIP is perceived susceptible to crime because 
there is a lack of consistency in Malta’s CDD process, as this process is done separately by 167 
different IIP agents who only check on the IIP applicants they represent, from whom they 
receive high commission fees (Transparency International & Global Witness, 2018, p.30-32). 
With this double-role of marketer and CDD agent, there can be impartiality (Ibid). Besides, 
Legal Notice 24/2014 Article 6 states that under “special circumstances”, those with criminal 
records can obtain Maltese citizenship through IIP. This clause was objected by the Opposition 
Party, as it is ambiguous what these “special circumstances” are, therefore the government 
receives “the power to grant citizenship to whoever has a criminal record or is a threat to 
national security” (Vella, 2014). It was revealed that personal connections with high-
positioned politicians help in this process (EP, 2019b), proving how this Legal Notice gives the 
government more power. There is also no data released regarding the number and 
information of successful IIP applicants, as there is no distinction made in the annual 
naturalized citizens lists (EP, 2019a, p.21). Yet, this information is important, as more than 
38% of Malta’s naturalized citizens between 2014-2016 obtained their citizenship through IIP, 
most of them owning Russian and Azerbaijani citizenship (EP, 2018, p.18). Many IIP applicants 
are oligarchs and politicians who are suspected to be involved in financial crime by the US 
Treasury Department (Transparency International & Global Witness, 2018, p.31). For example, 
Russian billionaire Boris Mints and Pavel Melnikov are caught and suspected for committing 
fraud, money-laundering and tax evasion (Higgins, 2018). These evidences show the weakness 
of Malta’s CDD process, the growing power of government from this strategy and the risks led 
by the IIP to Malta and the EU. 
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In an attempt to cater to the HNWI’s needs, the Pilatus Bank was opened in 2014 – following 
a Maltese banking incentive for IIP recipients (Bernstein, 2019). Only after four years, its 
license was suspended by the ECB when its owner, Ali Sadr Hasheminejad, was charged with 
money-laundering, fraud and violation of a US economic sanction against Iran, as he used shell 
companies to transfer $115 million to Iran (Osborne, 2018; US Department of Justice, 2020). 
It was found that Sadr is an Iranian who used illicit funds to register Pilatus Bank on Maltese 
soil (Reel, 2018). Given that the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) categorizes Iran as a high-
risk country, the MFSA still granted an operating license to Pilatus Bank. The Pilatus Bank was 
notorious for being the hub of dirty transactions related to the IIP and shell companies owned 
by Muscat’s aides (Reel, 2018), as can be seen by how it assisted Muscat’s Chief of Staff – Keith 
Schembri, whose name also appeared on the Panama Papers, to launder €166,000 earned 
from Russians IIP recipients (EP, 2019a, p.10). This transaction was escorted by Schembri’s 
auditor – Brian Tonna, Nexia BT’s partner, who was often “bought” with lucrative income for 
public and private financial matters (Borg, 2019a; 2020). This scandal shows how 
financialization strategies strengthen clientelism and patronage relations, by bringing 
corrupted parties closer together, accelerating corruption practices in Malta.  
Besides, Pilatus Bank provided the Azerbaijani’s ruling elite a wealth hideout in Europe 
(Bernstein, 2019). It transacted the money extracted by Schembri and Konrad Mizzi – Malta’s 
former Energy Minister, through the Electrogas scandal. This scandal concerns Malta’s 
decision to buy gas from Electrogas – the joint corporation of Azerbaijani state oil company – 
SOCAR, and Siemens, because NexiaBT recommended that this deal is 20% “cheaper” (CoE, 
2019b, p.13-15; Berstein, 2019; Borg, 2018a). Consequently, the poorly-financed Electrogas 
cost Malta €450million and SOCAR profited over €40million from this deal, as the Maltese 
people are paying substantially more than they should for the Azerbaijani gas (Ibid). This 
incident shows how bad finance penetrated also into non-finance sector and how much power 
financialization gave to these two Ministers that they could approve such big deal even with 
due-diligence failure to consider cheaper options. Furthermore, Pilatus Bank was accused for 
assisting laundering money between Muscat’s wife shell company – Egrant, and Azerbaijani 
elites (CoE, 2019b, p.15). This is no wonder why Azerbaijani and Russian Member of 
Parliaments at the CoE tried to defend the dirty acts conducted by the Muscat’s aides and 
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Tonna (Borg, 2019b). It is also not surprising that the IIP’s biggest clients are Azerbaijanis and 
Russians. 
The use of Pilatus Bank for the transactions between offshore shell companies would not have 
been so popular without Malta’s favorable taxation system and lenient regulations. The 
Maltese Income Tax Law adopts the domicile/resident-based taxation system, providing more 
tax-planning opportunities. This is because any foreign company registered in Malta is entitled 
to tax exemption, which provides them to evade tax in their home country. Besides, the law 
is shaped in a way that beneficial owners and shareholder of companies may remain 
confidential or could be hidden by using a nominee (Grey & Arnold, 2018). These laws show 
how the mechanisms of these financialization strategies create hurdles for investigations, 
resulting only two fines were issued out of 21 infringements found in 22 banks (Hornig & 
Morena, 2019). 
These scandals illustrate how deeply Malta is captured by politics for the privilege of finance. 
To understand how this is possible, it is important to understand how financialization fortifies 
the power in the executive’s hand in Malta, resulting in broken checks and balances. The PM 
of Malta has extensive powers of appointment, as he has the power to appoint judges, 
magistrates and the Commissioners of Police (CoE, 2019b), meaning that he has a double role 
of being the government executive and prosecutor. This power is amplified by financialization, 
as financialization strategies were placed high on Muscat’s administration’s agenda, which 
“allowed” Malta’s executives the power to defend Malta’s financialization strategies for 
“national competitiveness”. However, this power went too far that the executives intervened 
in the prosecution of criminal offences related to these strategies to defend their aides. For 
example, whilst the FIAU is supposed to be established as an independent AML body, only 
“approved” investigators were allowed to investigate the mentioned scandals (Ibid, p.10). 
Besides, Muscat’s appointed Commissioner of Police – Lawrence Cutajar, remained in office, 
despite being ordered to resign by the vast public after his poor performance during the 
Pilatus Bank and Egrant scandal (Times of Malta, 2020a). Not surprisingly, the whistleblower 
and Caruana-Galizia’s source behind the Pilatus Bank scandal – Maria Efimova, faced 
prosecutions related to fraud quickly, whilst the proceedings against government officials in 
Panama Papers were blocked (EP, 2019a, p.7). Yorgen Fenech – the convicted murderer of 
Caruana-Galizia, is also not officially prosecuted until today due to his close relations with 
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Schembri and the investigator of this proceeding (Agius, 2020). Despite public pressure, 
Muscat had the power to keep Schembri and Mizzi in office and offered them lucrative 
governmental consultancy contracts after their resignations (Times of Malta, 2020b). These 
examples portray how much power financialization gave to the executives that resulted in the 
over-centralization of power to the extent that the rule of law is breached (CoE, 2019b).  
The executive’s power was not only limited in governmental institutions, but it penetrated 
deep in the society. Media was severely controlled, whereby journalists that revealed the ugly 
truths behind the government and its financialization strategies were often threatened or 
sued, together with their publications being removed (EP, 2018, p.9). This was possible 
because many private broadcasters are owned by political parties and the national 
broadcaster is also heavily influenced by the government (Ibid). Caruana-Galizia was also 
humiliated online with her private life and photos being published by the media adviser of 
Muscat’s administration (CoE, 2019b, p.17-19). For those who are not directly under the 
state’s control, the power that these financialization strategies give to the government is used. 
For example, when a representative from Chetcuti Cauchi – an IIP agency, got broadcasted by 
a French television for shaming the government and IIP, the agency’s license got suspended 
(The Malta Independent, 2019a). Any party who had potential to reveal Maltese dark secret 
were all repressed with “punishments”, and Caruana-Galizia’s assassination is widely seen as 
the government’s biggest warning. This is clearly a breach in the right to freedom of 
expression.   
These corruption scandals cost Malta a fortune, because these strategies provide easy rents 
to the politicians and business elites, which give more incentives to these parties to be 
corrupted. It is estimated that corruption costs €725million annually, which amounts to 8.65% 
of Malta’s GDP (The Greens, 2018, p.42). Corruption here acts as the informal form of tax to 
the economy. Should Malta be free from corruption, it will cost €1,671 per person less 
annually (Ibid). This is exactly the problem of over-financialization situation, whereby “finance 
turns away from its traditional role serving society and creating wealth” to wealth extraction 
(Shaxson, 2018, p.9). 
These dirty stories make Malta the EU’s next “problem child” (Ibid). Despite warnings to 
counter financial crimes, Malta did not change, but instead, continue to pursue its 
financialization strategies, even through digital innovation. This field is dangerous, as 
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blockchain and cryptocurrency are prone to financial crime due to “their anonymity, cross-
borders nature and quick transferability” (Houben & Snyers, 2018). Even worse, Malta’s 
iGaming industry is often the target of the Italian Mafias, because gambling involves: (1)large 
cash-inflow and transactions that help to mask money-laundering, (2)no physical product, 
which complicates the tracking-process of the origin of money and (3)no tax in many 
jurisdictions (Fiedler, 2013). However, Malta turned a blind eye to rules and controls on these 
industries, because the economic benefits of facilitating these sectors are bigger than the 
benefits of legal compliance (Pauly, 2017). Simultaneously, despite external pressure, Malta 
took advantage of EU membership to enjoy economic privileges by functioning as a tax haven. 
When Malta assumed EU Presidency, despite EU finance ministers’ resistance, Malta used its 
power as EU Presidency to influence the EU agenda, e.g.: prevented itself from being listed as 
a tax haven by the EU, neglected the agendas of Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive and the relaunch 
of the Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base way that it had promised, and avoided the 
amendment of AML laws (Vincenti, 2017). The over-centralization of power and the non-
existing separation of powers in Malta angered the EU, especially regarding Caruana-Galizia’s 
assassination, because European values, the rule of law, press freedom and rules-based 
market economy were violated (Ibid). This was an EU-wide problem that Malta was facilitating 
financial crime and allowed the penetration of organized crime groups (OCGs) into the Union. 
These problems show the political conflict between the EU and Malta, as Malta degraded the 
EU’s regulation standards and the EU’s goal is definitely not breeding a “banana republic”.   
The Muscat administration called for a snap election in 2017, hoping they could assure security 
before the government got on “fire” from all accusations. However, since Caruana-Galizia’s 
murder, there was an increasing public pressure on Malta, due to the increase in investigations 
conducted by independent investigative journalists and organizations who continue Caruana-
Galizia’s work to fight for her justice and to expose the government. Governmental institutions 
and reports often defended the government, but such political oppression could not hold 
longer; resulting in a political crisis. Malta’s biggest demonstration since its dependence was 
held for weeks, demanding for Schembri, Mizzi and Muscat’s resignation (Ibid), as the public 
could no longer tolerate this newly-emerged Mafia State and definitely not its PM who was 
“awarded” as “2019 man of the year in organized crime and corruption” (OCCRP, 2019). Malta 
immediately plunged into a governmental crisis, following Malta’s Member of Parliament’s 
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call for an urgent debate regarding Malta’s constitutional and institutional crisis, arising from 
the “hijack” of Malta by organized crime and “institutionalized” murder (Micalief, 2019). The 
EP also pressed Muscat for immediate resignation (Rankin, 2019). Although Muscat resigned 
in mid-January 2020, this late resignation is seen as a serious threat to the rule of law, 
democracy and fundamental rights of Malta. 
In short, albeit there are no directly causality links, there is co-relation between 
financialization and corruption, because there are patterns that suggest these scandals went 
hand-in-hand with Malta’s financialization strategies. This is mainly because the process of 
financialization gave more power to the executives, by either having legislation that 
consolidated more power and/or enabling Muscat’s power that would not have been used if 
it was not to defend these financialization strategies. This is the double-fold political risk that 
is exposed: First, these strategies strengthen clientelism/patronage relations, because 
financialization brought (corrupted) economic elites closer together; Second, Malta’s 
smallness eases the political oppression by the government, given the economic miracle led 
by the financialization strategies undertaken. In this situation, financialization no longer 
creates wealth for the aggregate economy, but leads to wealth extraction by the economic 
elites. These reasons show that financialization does amplify illegality in Malta, as finance and 
illegality intertwined and turned Malta into a Mafia State, which led to the ongoing political 
turmoil.  
Economic Risk  
According to the Dutch Disease, when foreign cash enters a state to exploit a booming sector, 
the exchange rate of the state will appreciate; Consequently, the deteriorated price 
competitiveness in exports and high spending level will leave negative economic impacts 
(Corden, 1984). Nevertheless, Malta managed to partially contain the effects of this Disease, 
as it has little influence on the value of the Euro. Besides, Malta smartly uses digital innovation 
to reinforce its already strong tourism sector through “blockchain tourism” (Ćirić & Ivanišević, 
2018). For example, Malta actively hosts annual conferences and festivals like SiGMA and the 
Blockchain Summit. This strategy, together with friendly legislations, led to an influx of capital 
investment, business people, researchers and experts (Ibid). By doing so, crowding-out of the 
tourism sector is avoided. However, given the success of these financialization strategies, 
Malta put attention solely on these industries and no longer has interest to diversify the 
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economy and to address long-term challenges (Christensen et al, 2016). Such over-
dependence on finance makes Malta running the risk of crowding-out, brain drain, damage to 
entrepreneurialism and long-term growth damage in the long-run. This is because finance-
related industries will leech out skilled-workers from other industries – a form of brain drain 
within industries. Since most investments are directed to these industries, most 
entrepreneurs will focus solely on these areas and neglect the others, leading to the damage 
to entrepreneurialism.  
The increasing international exposure of Malta’s economy attracts financial crime and 
organized crime (CoE, 2019a, p.9), as over-financialization attracts mobile finance into the 
economy. This danger, originating from Malta’s tax regime that attracts “hot money”, is 
illustrated by FDI flows and non-financial corporate liabilities to foreign parent corporations 
that amount to 30% of Malta’s GDP (IMF, 2018b), but the tax generated after refund is merely 
€247million in 2015 (Vella, 2016). This is possibly why Malta’s Gross National Income (GNI) is 
higher than its GDP, as many multinational corporations set up subsidiaries in Malta. These 
subsidiaries are usually registered as limited liability entities – the equivalent of letterbox 
companies, which often combine company names that include “Finance” and “Holding” 
(Dahlkamp et al, 2017). This strategy is popular because it only costs €1200 and less than 24 
hours (Ibid). Not surprisingly, many of these corporations own small offices in Malta that are 
managed by the same staff (Ibid). Their mere physical presence amplifies their intention to 
exploit Malta’s tax regime and not to bring net contribution to Malta’s economy. “Don’t tax 
or regulate us too much or you will be ‘uncompetitive’ and we will run away to Geneva or 
London or Hong Kong” is the way how these companies threaten Malta (Shaxson & 
Christensen, 2013, p.4), which shows how mobile they are and how little net contribution they 
give to Malta. The same applies to many HNWIs who exploit Malta’s tax system. This leads to 
an increase from 30.4% to 48.3% in terms of GDP in offshore wealth, or tax evasion by 
individuals, in Malta between 2013-2016 (EC, 2019a, p.171). Such offshore wealth further 
increases mobile finance in Malta’s economy.  
Malta’s tax regime also attracted OCGs, mainly the Italian Mafias, as the same logic applies – 
dirty money goes to where the highest return rate is, even better – with high opportunity to 
launder money and the perks of geographical proximity. Mafioso set up Maltese shell 
companies, for example, the ‘Ndrangheta had previously set up Haru Pharma Limited in Malta 
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to transfer its cocaine money from its shell company in St. Kitts and Nevis (Winterbach, 2017). 
Besides, Malta’s iGaming industry has become “an ATM for the Italian Mafia” since 2013-2014 
(Civillini & Anesi, 2018). Many illegal betting shops owned by the Mafias used Maltese iGaming 
companies to cover-up their involvement in financial crime and abuse Malta’s 
domicile/residence-based tax system by mixing legal and illegal bets, and submitting false tax 
returns (Ibid; Martin, 2019). This modus operandi further blurs the origin of dirty money. 
Consequently, these casinos are the Italian Mafia’s alternative form of shell companies in 
Malta. Malta is the biggest loser in this scenario, because it has not only attracted bad finance 
that comes with OCGs’ penetration in the economy, but it also suffers €53million loss in 
corporate taxes and €71million in betting duty that are supposed to be immobile finance 
which can be used to boost the local economy (Ibid).  
These harmful tax practices have arguably made Malta the European version of Panama. This 
artificial profit shifting process is not directly harmful for Malta, as it operates the business 
model of “earning 5% is better than nothing”, but this is a big problem for the EU. Many other 
EU Member-states with higher tax rates, like Germany, run relocation risks, having entities 
escaping to low tax states like Malta. This leads to states, including the Netherlands and 
Luxembourg, to engage in a tax war in the last five years (Eurodad, 2017, p.13). This is exactly 
what “competition” entails in the Finance Curse, whereby all states compete for their 
“competitiveness” that leads to a “race-to-the-bottom” on corporation taxation. The danger 
here is that tax-cutting is contagious, which leads to international contagion of tax-cutting 
across the region due to the international connectedness of the EU. Consequently, the EU 
loses €60billion in tax income annually and EU Member-states lose averagely 13% of public 
revenue (Sawulski, 2020, p.13), illustrating the economic risks Malta exposes to the EU in the 
long run. 
The absorption of bad finance through financialization left damaging impacts on the housing 
market. Malta’s property price increases at 17% annually in the last decade (Everett-Allen, 
2018). There are also “signs of overheating” in the property rental market, by which the rental 
price increased by 47.7% between 2013-2016, because properties were rented “according to 
[one’s] ability to pay” (Grech, 2017b). However, Malta’s minimum wage only rose by 8.4%, 
from €702.82 to €761.97 (Eurostat, 2020), and average wage rose by 12.5% from €1,600 to 
€1,800 between 2013-2020 (Camilleri, 2019). The wage increase is unable to catch-up with 
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this speed of rising property prices, as one has to earn higher than the national average, 
namely at least €20,000 per annum, to be able to afford a cheap property in 2016 (Camilleri, 
2019). This suggests the possibility of a housing bubble in Malta, yet the government refused 
to impose price controls (Ibid). The IIP is accused of causing soaring property prices, as due to 
the property purchase/lease obligation, most properties were built to cater the HWNIs 
(Foroudi, 2019). However, these properties are mostly left unoccupied (Sietsma & Mulder, 
2019). Malta should be alert that real estate investment is the oldest “traditional” way for 
money-laundering (Remeur, 2019, p.2), and political land corruption is widespread in Malta 
(Caruana-Galizia & Caruana-Galizia, 2017). These phenomena cause a serious price distortion 
in the property market, resulting in relatively high private debt to gross disposable income 
(EC, 2020, p.5). These are all bad finances, as they are not aimed at boosting the local 
economy, but they are speculative and intertwined with illegality, and can lead to greater 
economic risk like the housing bubble and/or financial crisis.  
As shown, the economic risk that resulted directly from over-financialization are partially 
contained by the government, given that “blockchain tourism” works well and the economic 
impacts of Malta’s tax regime are not exceptionally devastating to its economy. However, the 
economic risk exposed to Malta is mainly spilled over from its political risk. Financialization 
accelerates political corruption in Malta to the extent that it involves blood (Caruana-Galizia’s 
death) and political turmoil. Consequently, Malta’s attractiveness as an FDI destination has 
decreased since 2017, especially in terms of political, legal and regulatory stability and 
transparency (EY, 2019, p.20-21). The political turmoil happened only in January 2020, causing 
Valletta to be isolated and local businesses to be affected (Sansone, 2019). The Central Bank 
of Malta (CBM) predicted that Malta’s political instability poses a threat to its economy, as it 
can cause a negative impact on public finances that comes with postponement of private 
consumption and investment (Ibid). Many business associations and unions also worry that 
reputational damage could cause business uncertainties (Vella, 2019). All these factors can 
further lead to long-term economic damage. 
Overall, one should not be blinded by the “glory” of financialization strategies, as they have 
attracted substantial amounts of bad finance. Not all bad finances are intertwined with 
illegality, but they can cause harmful economic impacts in the long-run. Another finding from 
this section is that the economic risks exposed are heavily influenced by the political risks that 
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Malta faced. Yet, due to short-term observation, the long-term economic impacts of Malta’s 
political crisis still need to be followed. Nevertheless, these financialization strategies 
facilitated wealth extraction by the elites, while the society has to pay for the external costs.  
Societal Risk 
Malta’s financialization strategies are promoted to make its finance sector more 
“competitive” for wealth creation, but the “competition” here is not the “perfect 
competition”, whereby each participant is a winner. Contrarily, over-financialization occurred 
and left a range of external costs to the society, namely in terms of welfare and security risks.   
First, Malta’s tax regime gives privileges to the rich to become more “competitive”, but this 
privilege cost Malta €5.2billion in tax evasion/avoidance (EC, 2019a, p.172). In this zero-sum 
economy, when some pay less tax, the government has to generate public revenue through 
other means, namely spending cuts and/or tax increase on others (Eurodad, 2017, p.15). 
These measurements impose burden on the non-privileged taxpayers. For example, while 
most financial services are free from VAT, VAT on other goods and services is applied. The 
former is used more by the rich, and the latter applies to all, yet daily household goods and 
services entail a larger share for the poor than the rich (Ibid). Second, Malta’s informal tax on 
the society – corruption, cost the society €725million, which amounts to 65% of the national 
social expenditure budget (The Greens, 2018, p.41). Both taxes force the non-privileged 
taxpayers to end up paying “more” cost for public goods provision and this leads to a wider 
inequality gap.  
Malta’s Human Development Index (HDI) tops at 0.885, but when GNI rank minus HDI rank is 
used as an indicator to check whether the welfare is trickled-down, Malta’s figure follows the 
suit of other resource/finance-dependent states, namely it has been declining closer and 
closer to a negative figure in the last decade (UNDP, 2018). This entails that less wealth being 
invested in true human development (Shaxson & Christensen, 2013, p.17). For this reason, the 
rate of those at-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion grew from 15.3% to 16.8% (Caruana, 2019). 
People from this group suffer from the inflation in the housing market due to the 
government’s failure in price-controlling in properties and taxing property hoarders (Agius, 
2018), thus many properties are left vacant for speculative activities (The Malta Independent, 
2019b). Furthermore, there is a lack in social-housing and currently the real-estate industry 
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only develops high-end properties for the HNWIs (Agius, 2018; Grech, 2019). This explains why 
the percentage of Malta’s homelessness increases, even among people who have a full-time 
or part-time job (Ibid).  
To defend itself from the accusations that Malta is increasing poverty, Malta claims that its 
iGaming industry generates capital and shows “healthy increase in wages” (IMF, 2018a). 
However, only workers in this industry enjoy higher salary, because other sectors cannot 
compete with the salaries offered by iGaming industry. This is problematic, because 
approximately 67% of the employees in this industry are non-Maltese, which means that the 
Maltese people are not the biggest beneficiaries (Ibid). The same applies to the blockchain 
and cryptocurrency sector. This problem can be attributed to Malta’s education sector. Whilst 
GDP has increased by 7.2% for the last decade, the spending on education dropped from 5.4% 
to 4.9% as a percentage of GDP (EC, 2019b, p.5). Although this number is still higher than the 
EU’s average, the result of this investment is poorer in EU comparison. There is insufficient 
school infrastructure and although there is an expansion in education, Malta still hosts a high 
number of low-skilled workers and the skills produced do not match with the market needs 
(Ibid, p.8-12; EC, 2020, p.5). This indicates that the education sector is not given sufficient 
attention to “catch-up” with the financialization strategies that accelerate at a higher speed. 
Consequently, financialization through innovation actually increases the wage gap and 
contributes to higher inequality.  
Although these welfare risks did not directly arise from the interconnection between Malta’s 
financialization strategies and illegality, mobile finance from these strategies led to over-
financialization and welfare cost. It is also financialization that leads to the over-centralization 
of power in the executive’s hand that the people do not get voices to redistribute the welfare 
in the economy better.  
Besides welfare risks, Malta’s financialization strategies also led to security risks due to the 
Italian Mafia’s infiltration in Malta’s legitimate businesses. Originally, Malta had no historical 
presence of organized crime, but it has now become the Italian Mafia’s destination to conduct 
illegal activities. Even worse, these Italian Mafias attract different OCGs, including the North 
African, Albanian and Balkan OCGs, to gather in Malta (Raineri, 2019; DIA, 2016). The presence 
of Italian Mafias turned Malta into a transaction point between the North Africa coast and 
Europe for illicit arms trade, illicit trafficking of tobacco products and human trafficking and 
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smuggling (Ibid). Since then, financial crime has escalated into violent crime as well. For 
example, there is an increasing number of explosives in Malta, namely 19 bomb attacks in the 
last decade (Pace, 2017). These explosives were sold or smuggled by the Italian Mafias, and 
most bombing cases are connected to the Mafias’ oil-smuggling and drug-trafficking activities 
(Ibid). The common bomb attack involves detonating bomb(s) in the targeted person’s car 
(Ibid), which is how Caruana-Galizia was killed. These assassins have indeed bought bombs 
from the Mafia (Harvey, 2019). These examples show that the society’s security is 
compromised by Malta’s financialization strategies. 
Academic researches often state that a mafia and/or shadow state will end up becoming a 
failed state, as illegality can lead to a “decay of formal state institutions”, conflict, civil war and 
state collapse (Reno, 1995,p.1; 2000; Naim,2012). Despite being labelled as a mafia state and 
shadow state, Malta is not a failed state, given its impressive economic achievements (Raineri, 
2019). This provides the chance for the Maltese elites to de-securitize organized crime at 
national level, which allows them to portray organized crime as an opportunity instead of a 
threat for national “competitive” purpose (Ibid). This is a significant hazard to society, because 
without securitization, organized crime will never be a priority at the national agenda and 
even worse, Malta’s national interest can possibly be influenced by the Mafias.   
Despite Malta’s passive attitude towards organized crime, the securitization of organized 
crime has been pressed by the EU, Europol and the FATF (Ibid). The network of Italian Mafias 
is big and their joint-business is worth €110billion annually in Europe itself (Times of Malta, 
2019), which is why the Southern Spain and Eastern Cyprus have been highly securitized due 
to their proximity to the Mediterranean Sea (Gounev & Bezlov, 2010). However, Malta 
provides a new and better hideout for the OCG, as many illegal activities are condoned here. 
Malta has eased the operation of illegal activities and its toleration to the infiltration of the 
Mafias in its state is seen as the facilitation of the Mafias’ expansion in the EU. This is a big 
threat to both Maltese and the European security, because organized crime is named the 
biggest threat to European internal security by Europol, whereby Cosa Nostra and 
‘Ndrangheta are Europe’s biggest OCGs (Times of Malta, 2019).  
In short, the welfare risks that are exposed are mostly due to the over-centralization of power 
in the politicians’ hands given by the financialization strategies that hinders the redistribution 
of welfare. Whereas, security risks that are exposed are mainly due to the attraction of OCGs. 
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Here, it is Malta’s financialization strategies that provide the OCGs a platform to turn all 
criminal activities into real. Both are equally seen as societal risks, because it is the society 
who has to take the burden of these external costs.  
Conclusion 
This thesis argues that Malta’s economic development has to be studied by taking the net 
contribution of Malta’s financialization strategies to its economy into account, namely not 
only its contribution to the GDP, but the wider impact on the Maltese economy and society, 
including the effect of illegality that is closely intertwined with the process of financialization. 
To do this, the thesis adapted the Finance Curse that outlines three major channels through 
which over-financialization can negatively affect a country: economic, political, and social. 
The findings show that Malta’s political channel is the main link that connects the risks of 
financialization and illegality. This means that in Malta’s case, it is political risk that spills over 
to economic and societal risks. However, one must acknowledge that corruption exists in 
every economy, but there is a clear pattern that shows that financialization reinforced 
corruption in Malta, which arguably made it cursed by finance. This is because financialization 
leads to the over-concentration of power in the executive’s hand and it brings 
clientelist/patronage political relations closer. Given Malta’s smallness, the public can be 
easily oppressed, which eases the process of financialization, corruption and other financial 
crimes. This is the first type of bad finance: finance that is diverted to wealth extraction by the 
elites. This type of bad finance led to the Maltese political turmoil and distorted the EU 
standards, causing a political clash between Malta and the EU.  
The second type of bad finance attracted by Malta’s over-financialized economy is mobile 
finance that is speculative and not targeted at the aggregate welfare of the economy. In Malta, 
mobile finance is deceptive, because it makes Malta’s GNI higher than in reality. This comes 
primarily from corporations, HNWIs and OCGs that are registered in Malta to legitimize their 
illegal intentions to commit financial crimes. Albeit Malta tried to mitigate economic risks 
(through blockchain tourism), other unintended impacts can be observed, e.g.: its sky-
rocketing housing price. The EU also bears the economic risks posed by Malta – the race-to-
the-bottom of tax rates among EU Member-States and the loss of tax revenue. Besides, the 
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political risk that arose from wealth extraction will most certainly leave damaging effects on 
Malta’s economy.  
Both of these risks eventually leave societal impacts on Malta’s economy in terms of welfare 
and security risks. The over-centralization of power in elites’ hands made redistribution of 
welfare difficult, because privileges are given to the rich at the expense of society. Bad finance 
also led to the penetration of OCGs in Malta which threatened the society’s security. These 
risks would not have been exposed and/or accelerated without financialization. 
Financialization strategies intertwined with illegality and ended up overshadowing Malta’s 
economic performance. Taking these risks into account, this thesis emphasizes the importance 
of a more inclusive and holistic approach to study economic development, because these risks 
actually make Malta less affluent, as they lower the net contribution of financialization. 
The findings of this thesis contribute to the Finance Curse in several ways. First, for theory-
testing purpose, the case study of Malta shows that the Finance Curse can be applied to 
microstates, although Malta seems to be successful in financialization as an economic 
development model. An interesting finding here is that political risk is more detrimental to 
Malta, and it is political risk that spills over to economic and societal impacts. This means that 
different from the traditional Finance Curse theory, the root of Malta’s Finance Curse is the 
political risk, instead of the economic risk. This is a new insight for further research on the 
Finance Curse, specifically: the inherent problem of a state (political structure in Malta’s case) 
must be considered to understand how the spill-over effects of the Finance Curse work.   
Second, for theory-building purpose, this thesis shows that illegality is strongly related to 
financialization, and makes it more likely to take place in other more weakly-regulated 
developing countries. Although Malta employs sophisticated national and supranational 
mechanisms to curb illegality, illegality is widely present and significantly impactful in all three 
risks. Illegality complicates financialization by inviting not just financial crime, but the 
penetration of OCGs in Malta. This means that illegality also adds another sub-category of 
societal risk – security risk, which further lowers the net contribution of financialization in 
Malta. For these reasons, illegality cannot simply be disregarded and be labelled as 
“unmeasurable cost”, but it has to be included in the Finance Curse to construct a more 
comprehensive analysis on economic development. 
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All these contributions ultimately show the shortcomings of the “more finance, more growth” 
model, and stress the need to study economic net growth. The inclusion of the Finance Curse 
and illegality in studying finance-based economic development models emphasize that there 
are other factors that define economic development, other than GDP. By taking all these 
factors and their short-term and long-term effects into account, this thesis addresses the 
danger of finance-based economic development models, especially to smaller developing 
states who are likely to embark on financialization as well. Academically, this is fruitful for GPE 
and Security Studies.   
Nevertheless, there are several limitations that can be improved, if further research can be 
followed. First, the political turmoil in Malta took place very recently, which leads to limited 
short-term observation, especially on economic risks. Long-term impacts are vital to the study 
of the Finance Curse, therefore further research could strengthen the analysis of this thesis 
better. Second, illegality remains a difficult area to be studied, given the scarcity of sources, 
which is why this thesis relies on EU reports and independent investigation reports.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 38 
Bibliography 
Agius, M. (2018, November 17). Former Economy Minister says Malta can expect a housing 
crisis in five years. Malta Today. Retrieved March 22, 2020, from 
https://www.maltatoday.com.mt/news/national/90983/former_economy_minister_says_m
alta_should_expect_a_housing_crisis_in_five_years#.XoxoYS2Q1N0 
Agius, M. (2020, March 13). Police were going to question Yorgen Fenech at his office on 
Valletta’s suggestion. Malta Today. Retrieved March 2, 2020, from 
https://www.maltatoday.com.mt/news/court_and_police/100981/live_caruana_galizia_pub
lic_inquiry_assistant_police_commissioner_to_testify#.XoIGkC2Q1QJ 
Aitken, R. (2018, October 29). Crypto investors flocking to ‘Blockchain Island’ Malta in 
droves’. Forbes.  Retrieved February 20, 2020, from 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/rogeraitken/2018/10/29/crypto-investors-flocking-to-
blockchain-island-malta-in-droves/#32236b275ff9  
Aalbers, M.B. (2019). Financialization. In D. Richardson et al (Ed.): The International 
Encyclopedia of Geography: People, the Earth, Environment and Technology. Oxford: Wiley. 
Andreas, P. (2002). Transnational crime and economic globalization. In M. Berdal et al (Ed.), 
Transnational Organized Crime & International Security: Business As Usual?. Boulder: Lynne 
Rienner. 
Andreas, P. (2004). Illicit International Political Economy: The clandestine side of 
globalization. Review of International Political Economy, 11(3), 641-652.   
Andreas, P. (2011). Illicit globalization: Myths, misconceptions and historical lessons. Political 
Science Quarterly, 126(3), 403-425. 
Anesi, C. et al. (2018, October 10). Malta, a modern smugglers’ hideout. OCCRP. Retrieved 
April 20, 2020, from https://www.occrp.org/en/thedaphneproject/malta-a-modern-
smugglers-hideout 
Aljazeera. (2019, December 2). Joseph Muscat: The Maltese PM tarnished by scandal. 
Retrieved February 9, 2020, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/12/joseph-muscat-
maltese-prime-minister-tarnished-scandal-191201010200299.html 
 39 
Armstrong, H. W. & Read, R. (2000). Comparing the economic performance of dependent 
territories and sovereign microstates. Economic Development and Cultural Change, 48(2), 
285-306.  
Armstrong, H. W. & Read, R. (2003). The determinants of economic growth in small states. 
The Round Table, 92(368), 99-124. 
Bagloni, L. (2018, March 5). Maltese golden visas: Thumbs up? Thumbs down? Who knows? 
OCCRP. Retrieved April 20, 2020, https://www.occrp.org/en/goldforvisas/maltese-golden-
visas-thumbs-up-thumbs-down-who-knows 
Baker, A. et al. (2018). The UK’s Finance Curse? Costs and processes. Sheffield: Sheffield 
Political Economy Research Institute.  
Borg, J. (2019a, January 20). Separation deed raises questions on Schembri-Tonna ‘loan’. 
Times of Malta. Retrieved March 1, 2020, 
https://timesofmalta.com/articles/view/separation-deed-raises-questions-on-schembri-
tonna-loan.699516  
Borg, J. (2019b, June 30). Azerbaijan comes to PM’s ‘rescue’ in CoE. Times of Malta. 
Retrieved March 10, 2020, https://timesofmalta.com/articles/view/azerbaijan-comes-to-
pms-rescue-in-council-of-europe.718024 
Borg, J. (2020, January 5). Ex-Pilatus directior slammed ‘crazy’ Schembri-Tonna transaction. 
Times of Malta. Retrieved March 24, 2020, https://timesofmalta.com/articles/view/ex-
pilatus-director-slammed-crazy-schembri-tonna-transaction.761082  
Bouvatier, V. et al. (2017). Banks in tax havens: first evidence based on country-by-country 
reporting. European Economy Discussion Paper 055, 1-52. 
Camilleri, M (2019). Malta’s economy: The good, the bad and the uncertain. Retrieved March 
17, 2020, from the Isles of the Left website: https://www.islesoftheleft.org/maltas-economy-
the-good-the-bad-and-the-uncertain/ 
Carabott, S. (2019, December 1). Tell the world Muscat is not Malta: thousands march as 
protests continue. Times of Malta. Retrieved April 1, 2020, 
 40 
https://timesofmalta.com/articles/view/thousands-march-in-valletta-as-protestors-keep-up-
the-pressure.754096 
Caruana-Galizia, P. & Caruana-Galizia, M. (2017). Political land corruption: evidence from 
Malta – the EU’s smallest member-state. Journal of Public Policy, 38(4), 419-453.  
Cecchetti S. & Kharroubi, E. (2015). Why does financial sector growth crowd out real 
economic growth? BIS Working Paper No. 490, 1-29. 
Christensen, J. et al. (2015). The Finance Curse: Britain and the world economy. The British 
Journal of Politics and International Relations, 18(1), 255-269. 
Christians, A. (2017). Buying in: residence and citizenship by investment. Saint Louis 
University Law Journal 62, 51-72.  
Ćirić, Z, & Ivanišević, S. (2018). Blockchain and tourism development. 3rd International 
Thematic Monograph – Thematic Proceedings: Modern Management Tools and Economy of 
Tourism Sector in Present Era, 565-605.  
Civillini, M. & Anesi, C. (2018, May 10). How Maltese online gambling became an ATM for 
the Italian Mafia, OCCRP. Retrieved March 2, 2020, 
https://www.occrp.org/en/thedaphneproject/how-maltese-online-gambling-became-an-
atm-for-the-italian-mafia 
Coulibaly, B. (2009). Effects of financial autarky and integration: The case of the South Africa 
embargo. Journal of International Money and Finance, 28(3), 453-478. 
Council of Europe (CoE). (2019a), AML and counter-terrorist financing measures: Malta. 
Strasbourg: CoE. 
CoE. (2019b). Daphane Caruana-Galizia’s assassination and the rule of law in Malta and 
beyond: ensuring the whole truth emerges. Strasbourg: CoE.  
Dahlkamp, J. et al. (2017, May 24). Playing the shell game in the Mediterranean. Spiegel 
International. Retrieved from March 11, 2020, 
https://www.spiegel.de/international/business/malta-the-european-union-s-very-own-tax-
haven-a-1148915.html  
Deloitte. (2019). International Tax Malta Highlights 2019. Valletta: Deloitte. 
 41 
Dharmapala, D & Hiners Jr. J. (2009). Which country become tax haven? Journal of Public 
Economics, 93(9-10), 1059-1068 
DIA. (2016). Relazione del Ministero dell’Interno sull’attività svolta e sui risultati conseguiti 
dalla Direzione Investigativa Antimafia. Roma: Ministero dell’Interno.  
Epstein, G. (2015). Financialization: There’s something happening here. University of 
Massachusetts Political Economy Research Institute Working Paper Series 394, 1-20. 
Eurodad. (2017). Tax games: The race to the bottom. Brussels: Eurodad.  
EC. (2019a). Estimating international tax evasion by individuals. Taxation Working Paper 179, 
1-210. 
EC. (2019b). Education and training monitor 2019: Malta. Luxembourg: EU.  
EC. (2020). Country report Malta 2020. Brussels: EC.  
EP. (2018). Citizenship-by-investment and Residency-by-investment schemes in the EU. 
Brussels: EP. 
EP. (2019a). Report on financial crimes, tax evasion and avoidance (2018/2121(INI)). 
Brussels: EP. 
EP. (2019b). Motion for a resolution on the rule of law in Malta following the recent 
revelations surrounding the murder of Daphne Caruana-Galizia (2019/2954(RSP)). Brussel: 
EP. 
European Banking Federation (EBF). (n.d.). Malta’s banking sector: Facts & figures. Retrieved 
February 22, 2020, from the EBF website: https://www.ebf.eu/malta/ 
Eurostat. (2020). Monthly minimum wages. Retrieved March 27, 2020, from Eurostat wbsite: 
https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Minimum_wage_statistics  
Everett-Allen, K. (2018, September 11). Malta bucks trend of moderate house price growth. 
Retrieved March 3, 2020, from Knight Frank website: 
https://www.knightfrank.com/blog/2018/09/11/global-house-price-index-q2-2018  
 42 
EY. (2019). How do you get to next before next goes to you? EY Attractiveness Survey Malta 
2019. Valletta: EY.  
Fabri, D. & Baldacchino, G. (1999). The Malta Financial Service Centre: a study in microstate 
dependency management? In M.P. Hampton & J.P. Abbott (Ed.) Offshore finance and tax 
havens: The rise of global capital. Basingstoke: Macmillan.  
Faccio, T. (2017). Is Malta a tax haven?: Implications for Europe during the Maltese 
Presidency and beyond. Brussels: EP.   
Fiedler, I. (2013). Online gambling as a game changer to money-laundering? SSRN Online 
Journal. Retrieved April 18, 2020, from  
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2261266 
Finance Malta. (n.d.). Double Taxation Treaties. Retrieved March 22, 2020, from Finance 
Malta website:  https://www.financemalta.org/double-taxation-agreements/ 
Fine, B. (2015). Thirteen things you need to know about neoliberalism. Critical Sociology, 
43(4-5), 685-706.  
Fisman, R. & Love, I. (2004). Financial development and intersectoral allocation: A new 
approach. Journal of Finance, 69(6), 2785-2807. 
Fisman, R. & Love, I. (2007). Financial dependence and growth revisited. Journal of the 
European Economic Association, 5(2-3), 470-479. 
Foroudi, L. (2019, July 18). Malta’s tax incentives lead to a building boom. Financial Times, 
Retrieved March 11, 2020, https://www.ft.com/content/c82afcac-a24e-11e9-974c-
ad1c6ab5efd1  
Giovannini, A. et al. (2013). Financial markets, banks and growth: Disentangling the links. 
Revue de LÓFCE 2013/5 131, 105-147. 
Goldsmith, R. (1969). Financial structure and development. New Haven: Yale University 
Press. 
Gounev, P. & Bezlov, T. (2010). Examining the links between organized crime and corruption. 
Brussels: EC. 
 43 
Grech, A.G. (2015). The evolution of the Maltese economy since independence. Valletta: 
CBM. 
Grech, A.G. & Zerafa, S. (2017). Challenges and opportunities of sustainable economic 
growth: The case of Malta. Valletta: CBM. 
Grech, D. (2019, February 9). Number of homeless people who work is rising. Times of 
Malta. Retrieved April 11, 2020, https://timesofmalta.com/articles/view/working-homeless-
in-malta-are-rising.701479 
Grech, H. (2017a, May 25). Is Malta really Europe’s ‘pirate base’ for tax? BBC News. 
Retrieved March 31, 2020, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-40026826 
Grech, H. (2017b, November 30). Malta average rental prices increase by 47% between 
2013-2016, signs of ‘overheating’. The Malta Independent. Retrieved April 24, 2020,  
https://www.independent.com.mt/articles/2017-11-30/local-news/Malta-average-rental-
prices-increase-by-47-between-2013-2016-signs-of-overheating-6736182097 
Grey, S & Arnold, T. (2018, November 9). Exclusive: Mystery company named by murdered 
Maltese journalist is linked to power station developer. Reuters. Retrieved March 11, 2020, 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-malta-daphne-offshore-exclusive/exclusive-mystery-
company-named-by-murdered-maltese-journalist-is-linked-to-power-station-developer-
idUSKCN1NE18M 
Harvey, O. (2019, December 4). Murderous Mafia of Malta: How gangsters have free rein on 
holiday island where car bombing that killed reported has led PM to quit. The Sun. Retrieved 
April 15, 2020, https://www.thesun.co.uk/news/10477854/malta-gangsters-reporter-probe-
bomb/ 
Henley, J. (2018, June 2). Citizenship for sale: how tycoons can go shopping for a new 
passport. The Guardian. Retrieved February 22, 2020,  
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jun/02/citizenship-by-investment-passport-
super-rich-nationality 
Higgins, A. (2018, October 31). On a tiny Finnish island, a helipad, 9-Piers – and the Russian 
military? The New York Times. Retrieved April 1, 2020, 
 44 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/31/world/europe/sakkiluoto-finland-russian-
military.html 
Hornig, F. & Moreno, J. (2019, December 6). Malta emerges as the EU’s next problem child. 
Der Spiegel. Retrieved April 22, 2020, https://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/galizia-
murder-investigation-shows-deep-corruption-in-malta-a-1300088.html 
Houben, R. & Snyers, R. (2018). Cryptocurrencies and blockchain: Legal context and 
implications for financial crime, money-laundering and tax evasion. Brussels: EP. 
IMF. (2018a). Malta’s good bet. Retrieved March 22, 2020, from IMF website: 
https://blogs.imf.org/2018/05/07/maltas-good-bet/  
IMF. (2018b). Malta IMF Country Report No.18/20. Washington: IMF. 
IMF. (2019). 2019 Article IV Consultation – Press release: Staff Report; and Statement by the 
Executive for Malta. Washington: IMF.  
Kakazu, K. (1994). Sustainable development of small island economies. New York: West-view 
Press.  
King, R. & Levine, R. (1993). Finance and growth: Schumpeter might be right. Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, 108, 717-737. 
Koligkionis, C. (2017). Money laundering and the role of offshore financial centers. In 
Spinellis et al (Ed.), Europe in crisis: crime, criminal justice and the way forward. Athens: Ant. 
N. Sakkoulas Publishers L.P. 
Kotz, D. (2010). Financialization and neoliberalism. In Teeple, G. & McBride (Ed.), Relations of 
Global Power: Neoliberal Order and Disorder. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.  
Kotz, D. (2015). The rise and fall of neoliberal capitalism. Massachusetts: Harvard University 
Press. 
Krippner, G. (2005). The financialization of the American economy. Socio-Economic Review, 
3, 173-208.  
Levine, R. & Zervos, S. (1998) Stock markets, banks and economic growth. American 
Economic Review, 88(3), 537-558. 
 45 
Levine, R. (2005). Finance and growth: theory and evidence. In P. Aghionand S. N. Durlauf 
(Ed.), Handbook of Economic Growth (p.666-924). London: Elsevier.  
Library of Congress. (2018, August 31). Malta: government passes three laws to encourage 
blockchain technology. Retrieved February 22, 2020, from The Library of Congress website: 
https://www.loc.gov/law/foreign-news/article/malta-government-passes-three-laws-to-
encourage-blockchain-technology/ 
Malta Individual Investor Programme Agency (MIIPA). (n.d.). Individual Investor Programme. 
Retrieved February 22, 2020, from MIIPA website: https://iip.gov.mt/individual-investor-
program/ 
Maltese Citizenship Act (CAP.188). Individual Investor Programme of the Republic of Malta 
Regulations, 2014. L.N. 47 of 2014.  
Malta Immigration. (n.d.). Citizenship-by-Investment Malta. Retrieved April 23, 2020, from 
Malta Immigration website: https://www.maltaimmigration.com 
Martin, I. (2019, October 1). Investigation into organized crime and Malta’s online betting 
sector nets 51. Times of Malta. Retrieved April 1, 2020, 
https://timesofmalta.com/articles/view/investigation-into-organised-crime-and-maltas-
online-betting-sector.739207 
Naim, M. (2012). Mafia states: Organized crime takes office. Foreign Affairs, 91(3), 100-111. 
NexiaBT. (2019, November 20). Malta iGaming industry – the booming sector. Retrieved 
April 2, 2020, from NexiaBT website: https://www.nexiabt.com/insights/malta-igaming-
industry-the-booming-sector 
OCCPR. (2019). Joseph Muscat: 2019 man of the year in organized crime and corruption. 
Retrieved April 10, 2020, from OCCPR website: https://www.occrp.org/en/poy/2019/ 
Oxfam. (2016). Tax battles: the dangerous global race to the bottom on corporate tax. 
Oxfam Policy Paper, 1-46.  
Pace, M. (2017, October 19). Malta’s explosive history: 19 bomb attacks since 2010. Malta 
Today. Retrieved April 22, 2020, 
 46 
https://www.maltatoday.com.mt/news/national/81438/maltas_explosive_history_19_bom
b_attacks_since_2010#.XpB6gS2Q1QI 
Palan, R. (2002). Tax havens and the commercialization of state sovereignty. International 
Organization, 50(1), 151-176. 
Pauly, C. (2017, May 24). Malta plays fast and loose with online gambling firms. Spiegel 
International. Retrieved April 22, 2020, 
https://www.spiegel.de/international/business/dodgy-gaming-business-malta-plays-fast-
and-loose-with-online-gambling-firms-a-1148929.html 
Persaud, B. (2001). OECD curbs on offshore financial centers: A major issue for small states. 
The Round Table 359, 199-212. 
Popov, A. (2017). Evidence on finance and economic growth. ECB Working Paper Series 
2115, 1-78. 
Raineri, L. (2019). The Malta Connection: A corrupting island in a “corrupting sea”? The 
European Review of Organized Crime, 5(1), 10-35. 
Reel, M. (2018, September 11). Why the EU is furious with Malta. Bloomberg. Retrieved 
March 11, 2020, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2018-09-11/why-the-eu-is-
furious-with-malta 
Remeur, C. (2019). Understanding money-laundering through real estate transactions. 
Brussels: European Parliamentary Research Service. 
Reno, W. (1995). Corruption and state politics in Sierra Leone. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.  
Reno, W. (2000). Shadow states and the political economy of civil war. In Berdal M. & 
Malone D. (Ed.), Greed and Grievance. Economic Agendas in Civil Wars. London: Lynne 
Rienner. 
Rustomjee, C. (2016). Vulnerability and debt in small states. Policy Brief 83,1-6. 
Sansone, K. (2019, December 16). Political uncertainty risks impacting public finances, 
Central Bank warns. Malta Today. Retrieved April 22, 2020, 
 47 
https://www.maltatoday.com.mt/business/business_news/99280/political_uncertainty_risks
_impacting_public_finances_central_bank_warns#.XoxMjy2Q1N0 
Sawulski, J. (2020). Tax unfairness in the EU: Towards a greater solidarity in tax evasion. 
Warsaw: Polish Economic Institute.  
Sawyer, M. (2013). What is financialization? International Journal of Political Economy, 42(4), 
5-18. 
Shaxson, N. (2018). The Finance Curse: How global finance is making us all poorer. New York: 
Random House. 
Shaxson, N. (2019). Twenty reasons to shrink your financial center. Retrieved April 2, 2020, 
from Tax Justice Network website: https://www.taxjustice.net/2019/06/06/twenty-reasons-
to-shrink-your-financial-centre/ 
Shen, C. & Lee, C. (2006). Same financial development yet different economic growth: why? 
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 38(7), 1907-1944 
SiGMA. (n.d.) SiGMA. Retrieved April 1, 2020, from SiGMA website: 
https://sigma.com.mt/events/europe/ 
The Greens. (2018). The cost of corruption across the EU. Brussels: EP. 
The Malta Independent. (2019a, September 23). Passport agent who bragged about 
connections to government has license suspended. The Malta Independent. Retrieved March 
20, 2020, https://www.independent.com.mt/articles/2019-09-23/local-news/Passport-
agent-who-bragged-about-connections-to-ministers-has-licence-suspended-6736213853 
The Malta Independent. (2019b, May 22). Housing crisis affecting environment, public 
expenditure – FFA. The Malta Independent. Retrieved April 22, 2020, 
https://www.independent.com.mt/articles/2019-05-22/local-news/Housing-crisis-affecting-
environment-public-expenditure-FAA-6736208491 
Times of Malta. (2019, April 15). Organised crime is top threat to European security: Europol. 
Times of Malta. Retrieved March 21, 2020, 
https://timesofmalta.com/articles/view/organised-crime-is-top-threat-to-european-
security-europol.707547 
 48 
Times of Malta. (2020a, January 17). Police commissioner Lawrence Cutajar resigns. Times of 
Malta. Retrieved March 31, 2020, https://timesofmalta.com/articles/view/police-
commissioner-lawrence-cutajar-resigns.764085 
Times of Malta. (2020b, January 27). Konrad Mizzi given €80,000 consultancy job two weeks 
after resigning as minister. Times of Malta. Retrieved April 2, 2020, 
https://timesofmalta.com/articles/view/konrad-mizzi-given-80000-consultancy-job-two-
weeks-after-resigning-as.766708 
Transparency International & Global Witness. (2018). European Getaway; Inside the murky 
world of golden visas. Berlin: Transparency International.  
Transparency International. (2019). Corruption Perception Index 2019. Berlin: Transparency 
International.  
UNDP. (2019). Human Development Report 2019: Malta. New York: UNDP.  
US Department of Justice. (2020, March 16). Iranian national convicted for scheme to evade 
US Economic sanctions by illicitly sending more than $115 million through the US Financial 
system. US Department of Justice. Retrieved March 22, 2020, https://www.justice.gov/usao-
sdny/pr/iranian-national-convicted-scheme-evade-us-economic-sanctions-illicitly-sending-
more  
Vaghela. V & Tan, A. (2018, April 23). How Malta became a hub of the cryptocurrency world. 
Bloomberg. Retrieved April 1, 2020, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-04-
23/how-malta-became-a-hub-of-the-cryptocurrency-world-quicktake 
Veenendaal, W. (2019). How smallness fosters clientelism: A case study of Malta. Political 
Studies, 67(4), 1034-1052.  
Vella, M. (2014, March 20). PN files motion against citizenship scheme legal notice. Malta 
Today. Retrieved April 22, 2020, 
https://www.maltatoday.com.mt/news/national/37137/pn_files_motion_against_citizenshi
p_scheme_legal_notice#.XqLHSi2Q1QI. 
Vella, M. (2016, September 13). Every year Malta wipes out €2billion in foreign tax by giving 
shareholders 85% rebates on their tax. Malta Today. Retrieved April 23, 2020, 
 49 
https://www.maltatoday.com.mt/news/national/69486/every_year_malta_wipes_out_2_bil
lion_in_foreign_tax_by_giving_shareholders_85_rebates_on_their_tax_#.XqQKUy2Q1QI 
Vella, M. (2019, November 27). Businesses react to difficult days as Malta plunged into 
political crisis. Malta Today. Retrieved March 2, 2020, 
https://www.maltatoday.com.mt/business/business_news/98901/businesses_react_to_diffi
cult_days_as_malta_is_plunged_in_political_crisis#.XoxPEy2Q1QI 
Vincenti, D. (2017, January 12). Malta denounced as tax haven as it assumes EU Presidency. 
Euractiv. Retrieved March 20, 2020, https://www.euractiv.com/section/euro-
finance/news/malta-denounced-as-tax-haven-as-it-assumes-eu-presidency/ 
Vleck, W. Offshore finance and small states: Sovereign, Size and Money. New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan.  
Winterbach, C. (2017, May 21). Mafia-Blut an Maltas Geld. Der Spiegel. Retrieved April 11, 
2020, https://www.spiegel.de/wirtschaft/soziales/malta-files-wie-die-steueroase-die-mafia-
anlockt-a-1148446.html 
World Bank. (2018). Malta. Retrieved April 23, 2020, from the World Bank website: 
https://data.worldbank.org/country/malta 
World Bank. (2019). The World Bank in small states. Retrieved February 24, 2020, from the 
World Bank website: https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/smallstates/overview 
Xu, X. et al. (2015). Too much of a good thing? Prudent management of inflows under 
economic citizenship programs. IMF Working Paper WP/15/93, 1-34. 
Young, P & Ganado, M. (2019, April 7). Malta, blockchain and the prevention of money-
laundering, Times of Malta. Retrieved April 11, 2020, 
https://timesofmalta.com/articles/view/malta-blockchain-and-the-prevention-of-money-
laundering.706598 
